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THE GRIFFIN CASE: NEW AID FOR INDIGENT DEFENDANTS IN
CRIMINAL CASES
Marvin E. Aspen
An ideal of American jurisprudence is that
recourse to judicial process shall not be denied
because of the lack of financial resources.'
State courts have sought to follow this principle,
but in applying it have at times fallen short of
their professed standards.2 Present criminal
court procedures afford the indigent defendant
varied forms of legal aid such as the assignment
of counsel, 3 waiver of the cost of filing fees4
' With the passing of the sixth amendment in
1791, a federal court could not deprive an accused of
his life or liberty without the assistance of counsel.
In cases of indigency, such assistance was furnished
free to the defendant. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. A
provision of the Illinois constitution of 1818 pro-
vided that every person in Illinois "ought to obtain
right and justice freely, and without being obliged
to purchase it, completely and without denial,
promptly and without delay, conformably with the
laws". ILL. CONST. art. VIII, §12 (1818). A similar
provision is incorporated in the present Illinois con-
stitution. ILL. CoNsT. art. II, §19 (1870).
2 Sykes v. Warden, 201 Md. 662, 93 A.2d 549
(1953.) (court refused to appoint counsel for an
indigent's appeal); State v. Cater, 109 Iowa 69,
80 N.W. 222 (1899) (court has no authority to aid
an indigent in preparing appeal); De Long v.
Muskegon County, Mich. 568, 69 N.W. 1115
(1897) (court refused to compensate an attorney
appointed to aid an indigent).
3 See, e.g., CALIF. PEN. CODE §987 (Deering 1941);
ILL. REv. STAT. tit. 34 §163j, 163c, 163g (1955);
N. Y. Cams. CODE c. 883 (1949).
4 Trovar v. State, 39 Ariz. 528, 8 P.2d 247 (1932).
or waiver of the posting of security bonds.5
In addition, a majority of states provide an
indigent with a free transcript of the trial court
record in all criminal cases. 6 In several states, a
'State v. Watson, 208 N.C. 70, 179 S.E. 455
(1935). Aid has been denied, on occasion, for tech-
nical reasons, such as failure to meet statutory re-
quirements for, or improper filing of a formal docu-
ment stating the defendant's poverty and asking for
available relief in defraying court costs. State v.
Sallee, 151 Ore. 483, 48 P.2d 770 (1935); State v.
Pike, 205 N.C. 176, 170 S.E. 649 (1933); State v.
Knight, 20 Iowa 819,216 N.W. 104 (1927). Although
it is in the discretion of the trial court to determine
the defendant's pauper status, an abuse of this
discretion will usually be cause for reversal by the
reviewing court. Lenora v. State, 510 Okla. Crim.
291, 1 P.2d 832 (1931).
6 
Az. CODE ANN. §44-2525 (1939); Aax. STAT.
ANN. §22-357 (1947); CAiiF. CODE OF Civ. PRoc.
§274 (Deering 1949); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§3615,
8796 (1949); DEL. REv. CODE c. 108, §4226 (1935);
FLA. STAT. ANN. §924.23 (1944); IDAHO CODE §19-
2402 (1948); IND. STAT. ANN. §4-3511 (Bums
1946); IowA CODE AN. §793.8 (1950); Ky. REv.
CODE §28.460 (1948); LA. REv. STAT. tit. 15, §555
(1950); MASS. LAWS ANN. c. 278, §33 (1933);
MicH. STAT. ANN. §27.341 (1938); Miss. CODE
§1640 (1944); Mo. REV. STAT. §13354 (1943);
MONT. REV. CODE §93-1904 (1949); NEB. REv.
STAT. §24-342 (1948); NEV. STAT. XX §11029.03
(Supp. 1950); N. Y. Cams. CODE tit. 66, §456
(McKinney 1945); N. C. GEN. STAT. §9-89 (1944);
N. D. REv. CODE §27-0606 (1944); OKLA. STAT.
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transcript is awarded without cost to the
indigent only in special cases. 7 The remaining
states have no provision for free transcripts of
the trial court record for indigent defendants.8
However, in the recent case of Griffin v. Illinois,
the United States Supreme Court has set
forth new requirements upon the states in
regard to the issuance of transcripts to indigents
and, perhaps, in regard to other costs of appeal
as well.9
GRIFFIN V. ILLINOIS
After an indigent was convicted of a felony,
the trial court in the Griffin case refused his
request for a free transcript of the trial record.
The defendant had alleged that he required
this transcript in order to prepare a bill of
exceptions which was needed to obtain appellate
review.'0 In Illinois, the trial judge was required
tit.20 §111 (1937); ORE. Cormp. L. ANN. §93-276
(1940); S. C. CoDE §596 (1942); TENN. CODE
§§1108, 8819 (Williams 1934) (Defendant may use
narrative bill of exceptions, thus obviating necessity
of written transcript); TEx. CODE OF Clm. PRoc.
art. 760 (6) (Vernon 1950); UTAH CODE ANN.
§21-0-8 (1943); VA. CoDE AN. §8-330 (1980)
(narrative bill of exceptions permitted in lieu of
stenographic transcript); WASH. REv. STAT. §42-5
(Remington 1932); W. VA. CODE §5251 (Michie
1949); Wis. STAT. §252.20 (1945).
7 N. J. STAT. AiN. §2:195-22 (1939) (only when
conviction is for first degree murder and sentence is
death); PA. STAT. AN. tit. 19, §1232 (Purdon 1954)
(only when conviction is for first degree murder);
VT. REv. STAT. §1421 (1947) (only in sentences of
death or imprisonment of ten years or more). In
Ohio, the awarding of a free transcript is apparently
left to the discretion of the trial court. See, e.g.
State v. Trunzo, 137 N.E. 2d 511 (Ohio 1956).
8 Alabama, Colorado, Georgia, Kansas, Maine,
Maryland, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New
Mexico, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Wyoming
have no statute authorizing free transcripts of the
trial court record to indigent defendants in any
type of criminal case.
9 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
10 The transcript of the trial court record is in-
corporated in the appellant's bill of exceptions, a
document essential for review in most cases in
Illinois and other jurisdictions. People ex. rel.
to grant a free transcript only where review of
constitutional issues was sought" or where the
defendant had been sentenced to death.12 Free
transcripts were not obtainable under any
other circumstances. 3 After the Illinois Su-
preme Court had affirmed the trial judge's
denial of the request for a free transcript, the
defendant petitioned for and was granted a writ
of certeriori by the United States Supreme
Court. That Court, with four members dis-
senting, reversed the Illinois ruling, holding that
destitute defendants in criminal cases must be
afforded as adequate appellate review as de-
fendants who are able to pay the cost of trans-
scripts required for full review of their
convictions. The due process and equal protec-
tion clauses of the fourteenth amendment, 4 the
Court declared, require that a state afford equal
opportunity of appellate review to all de-
fendants in criminal cases, without regard to
their financial status.6
Iasello v. McKinlay, 409 Il." 120, 98 N.E.2d 728
(1951).
"ILL. REV. STAT. tit. 27, §163 f (1955).
"ILL. REv. STAT. tit. 28, §769a (1955).
"People v. LaFrana, 4 Ill.2d 261, 122 N.E.2d
583 (1954); People v. O'Connell, 411 Ill. 591, 104
N.E.2d 825 (1952); People v. Yetter, 386 Ill. 594,
54 N.E.2d 532 (1944). For a review of the past
practice of Illinois courts in handling requests for
free transcripts not authorized by statute, see
Comment, Post Trial Remedies, 42 J. Cim. L.,
C.&P.S. 636, 645 (1952).
'4 U.S. CONST. AmEND. XIV.
15 The Supreme Court reiterated the rule of
McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1894). which
held that appellate review is not a right guaranteed
to the individual by the United States Constitution.
However, the Griffin case modified the Durston rule
by holding that once a state sets up a system of
review, it cannot offer this privilege on a discrimina-
tory basis. Illinois afforded appellate review on equal
terms to both indigents and nonindigents. There
was therefore no affirmative descrimination against
indigents by the state. However, the Court held
that, by affording appellate review only to those
who could afford to pay the necessary costs, the
state had acted in a discriminatory manner. The
state was thus required to correct an inequity
produced by economic circumstances.
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REQUIREMENTS OF THE GRIFFIN
RULING
The Court did not expressly formulate the
procedure that a state must follow in affording
full appellate review to indigent defendants.
However, the Court indicated that conformity
to its ruling would not necessarily require the
granting of a free transcript in every appeal by
an indigent. The Court implied that a state
must provide a defendant with whatever means
are essential in each particular case for full
appellate review.
Appeals which involve the issue of whether
a conviction is against the weight of the evidence
generally require a full transcript of the trial
court record.16 However, in cases involving
other alleged errors, full review can often be
obtained without the necessity and expense of
reproducing the entire or a substantial part of
the trial court record. In these cases, such
devices as a "bystander's bill of exceptions,'
17
a "judge's note""' or an "appendix system" 9
16 Where the jury's evaluation of the weight of
the evidence or the court's instruction to the jury
in regard to the evidence is presented for review,
all the evidence must be set out in the appellant's
bill of exceptions. See, e.g., Ellis v. Central Trust
Co. of Owensboro, 307 Ky. 794, 211 S.W. 808
(1948); Kelley v. Cannon, 22 Tenn. App. 34, 117
S.W.2d 760 (1938); Law v. Gulf States Steel Co.,
229 Ala. 305, 156 So. 835 (1934).
17 "Such a bill may be prepared from notes kept
by counsel, from the judge's notes, from the recol-
lection of witnesses as to what occurred at the
trial, and, in short, from any and all sources which
will contribute to an accurate account of the trial
judge's action." Miller v. United States, 317 U.S.
192, 198 (1942). See, e.g., People v. Joyce, 1 Ill.2d
225, 115 N.E.2d62 (1953); 162 East Ohio Street
Hotel Corp. v. Lindheimer, 368 Ill. 294, 13 N.E.2d
970 (1938). Comment, Bills of Exception, 1 S.T.L.J.
401 (1955).
28 A judge's note is an account of the proceedings
prepared by the judge while a bystander's bill may
be prepared by any witness to the trial. See note
18 sapra.
19 This procedure has been used in New York
where the entire record is not essential to the appeal.
After the typewritten record is sent up to the
appellate court, the adversaries then print their
brief and, as an appendix to the brief, print so much
would serve as a less expensive, but neverthe-
less adequate, mode of preparing the appellant's
bill of exceptions. Where these alternative
methods of specifying errors in the trial court
are used, their cost of preparation, under the
policy of the Griffin ruling, must be borne by
the state in cases involving indigents. The cost
of these alternative devices, however, would
likely be far less than that of transcripts.
In addition to a transcript or other method of
describing the pertinent parts of the trial, a
brief, setting forth the defendant's arguments
in regard to the alleged errors, is usually re-
quired for full review by an appellate court.
20
.
In most states this brief must be in printed
form.2 Since this printed brief is usually equally
as essential to full review as the bill of excep-
tions, in instances where the indigent defendant
could not afford the cost of such a brief, denial
of a free printed brief may constitute a violation
by the state of the fourteenth amendment.
Thus, a reasonable application of the Griffin
principle would require a state to pay the cost
of preparing printed briefs, in addition to
transcripts, in appeals by indigents.2  An inex-
of the record as each party desires the court to read.
The appellant must also print in the appendix of
his initial brief the judgment or order appealed
from, the opinion of the lower court, findings of
fact, and conclusions of law. 17 N.Y.S.B.A. BULL.
14 (1955).
20 Since questions not presented and argued in
the assignment of errors are considered as waived,
a brief is often essential for appeal. Harrison v.
State, 231 Ind. 147, 106 N.E.2d 912 (1952); Nelson
v. Dodge, 76 R.I. 1, 68 A. 2d 51 (1949); Crampton
v. Osbord, 356 Mo. 125, 201 S.W.2d 336 (1947).
21 The appellate court rules of most states require
that an appellant's brief must be in printed form.
See, e.g., N.Y. Cr. oF ApP. RULE V; ILL. Sup. CT.
RULE 39; ILL. App. CT. RULE 7.
22 Of course only a brief adequate for full review
should be furnished without cost to the indigent by
the state. If, for example, the indigent appellant
can state his arguments adequately in a fifteen page
brief, the state should not be obliged to furnish an
elaborate two hundred page brief. In a jurisdiction,
such as Alabama, which makes the right of appeal
in criminal cases one of substance, a brief is not es-
sential to the consideration of errors on review. In
these states the appellate court has the duty to
[Vol. 47
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pensive solution to this problem would be the
relaxation of the requirement that briefs be
printed. In cases involvingindigents an appellate
court should allow the appellant to submit a
less costly typewritten brief.
Another expense often involved in an appeal
is the cost of obtaining counsel to prepare and
argue the appellant's case. The Griffin principle
should not require that a court furnish free
counsel to the indigent. Counsel, unlike the bill
of exceptions and the appellate brief, is helpful
but generally not essential to the defendant in
securing appellate review since an indigent
may personally prepare and argue his case on
appeal.n
Following the United States Supreme Court's
decision in the Griffin case, the Illinois Supreme
Court promulgated a court rule which pro-
vided that a free transcript shall be furnished
to all indigent appellants in all criminal cases.2
search the record for errors. Therefore, exceptions
not argued in the appellant's brief would not be
waived. See, e.g., Walker v. State, 90 So.2d 221
(Ala. 1956).
2 See, e.g., People v. Clark, 9 U1.2d 46, 137
N.E.2d 54 (1956); State v. Eckles, 137 N.E.2d 157
(Ohio 1956). It does not appear that the Griffin
rule has altered the present requirement that a
state need furnish an indigent with free counsel at
the trial only when denial of counsel would deny
the defendant a fair trial. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S.
455 (1942). Where absence of counsel at the trial
would not deny the indigent a fair trial, a state's
failure to provide such assistance would not con-
stitute discrimination against the indigent. Of
course, as a practical matter most states do assign
counsel to all indigent criminal defendants. See
note 3 supra.
24 Following the Griffin decision, the Supreme
Court of Illinois proclaimed a rule authorizing the
trial judge to award free transcripts to indigent
appellants. "In case of any defendant sentenced to
imprisonment after April 23, 1956, when upon veri-
fied petition of the defendant, judge who imposes
sentence, or in his absence any other judge of the
court, finds that the defendant is without financial
means with which to obtain a transcript of the pro-
ceedings of his trial, the judge shall order the re-
porter to transcribe his notes, in whole or part, as
is appropriate, and to deliver the transcript to the
Certainly the Illinois court should be com-
mended for promptly adopting the principles of
the Griffin holding. However, the Illinois ruling
failed to distinguish between cases in which a
transcript is essential for review and cases in
which such a transcript would be merely super-
fluous. Where a "judge's note" might be ade-
quate for the preparation of the indigent's bill
of exceptions, Illinois is now obliged to furnish
the more expensive partial or complete trial
court transcript. Illinois, by awarding free
transcripts for appellate review regardless of
what type of error is alleged, has perhaps
burdened itself with an unnecessary expense.s5
APPLICATION OF THE GRIFFIN
RULING TO MISDEMEANORS
The Griffin case involved a felony. For this
reason, a narrow interpretation of the holding
would limit its application to criminal cases
involving felonies. However, the Court did not
expressly confine its holding to felony cases and,
in addition, made no mention of a distinction
between felonies and misdemeanors.26 The
Griffin case held, in effect, that a state cannot
discriminate between capital and non-capital
cases in affording an indigent access to the
appellate courts.27 The significant difference
defendant without charge ... ." IL.. Sup. CT. RuLE
65-1, 135 N.E. 2d XXXII (1956).
215 In Illinois the printing cost is twenty cents
per transcription of one hundred words. Charges
in excess of $500 per completed transcript are
common. ILL. REv. STAT. tit. 37, §163 b, f. (1955).
26 Just as the application of the Griffin ruling to
misdemeanors might be questioned, an extension of
the ruling to civil proceedings would not be reason-
able. A distinction may be drawn between criminal
and civil cases. In criminal cases the need for appeal
arises as a result of some prior affirmative act on the
part of the state. In a civil case, the plight of the
contestants has normally not been brought about
through any affirmative act by the state. Therefore,
the state should be held responsible for the appeals
of indigents in the former cases, but not in the
latter. In addition, as a practical matter it is unlikely
that an indigent would be sued and equally unlikely
that an indigent possessing a valid claim for a money
judgment would be without aid to press his claim.
27 In the Griffin case, a state statute which au-
1957]
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between misdemeanors and felonies, as between
capital and non-capital offenses, lies in the
degree of punishment. 5 For this reason, the
Griffin interpretation of the fourteenth amend-
ment may require that a state afford aid in
securing appellate review to the indigent mis-
demeanant as well as to the indigent felon.
Nevertheless, there may be little demand for
the assistance which is available to the indigent
misdemeanant by virtue of the Griffin holding.
Conviction for a misdemeanor usually carries
with it a sentence not exceeding one year's
imprisonment.29 The indigent misfeasor could
in many instances serve his sentence and regain
his freedom in a period shorter than that be-
tween the dates of conviction and review. He
might often prefer this to the inconvenience
of an appeal. A defendant normally can avoid
imprisonment entirely by appealing and re-
maining free on bail. However, since an indigent
would not have funds to secure a transcript, he
would probably be equally unable to post bail.
A problem would exist only in the case of an
indigent misdemeanant who would insist upon
clearing his record by appellate review. How-
ever, a misdemeanant interested in clearing
his record would in all probability be able to
pay the costs attendant upon an appeal.
The Illinois court rule, which was promul-
gated after the Griffin decision, did not ex-
pressly indicate to which type of criminal case
it should apply. 5 However, the rule stated that
it shall apply to "any defendant sentenced to
imprisonment." Narrowly defined, "imprison-
ment" might refer exclusively to those
incarcerated in the penitentiary. Normally,
only those persons convicted of a felony would
receive a penitentiary sentence. On the other
hand, a broader definition of "imprisonment"
would include inmates of the county jail, most
of whom would be misdemeanants. If it were
to be interpreted narrowly so as to exclude
thorized the award of free transcripts only in cases
where the death sentence was involved was con-
sidered an inadequate compliance with the dictates
of the fourteenth ammendment.
2s See, e.g. ILL. REV. STAT. tit. 38, §586 (1955).
29 Ibid.
30 See note 24, supra.
misdemeanants, the Illinois ruling may not be in
conformity with the dictates of the Griffin
holding.
THE RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF
THE GRIFFIN RULING
The majority of the United States Supreme
Court in the Griffin case failed to indicate
whether its holding should be applied to those
indigents who were denied appeals prior to
that decision, as well as to those indigents who
are convicted subsequent to that case. 31 The
Court's lack of unanimity on the issue is evi-
denced by the conflicting views of the con-
curring opinion, which indicated that the
majority had erred in not declaring the ruling
retroactive, 32 and the minority opinion, which
felt that the majority had erroneously formu-
lated a retroactive ruling.3
If interpreted retrospectively, the Griffin
ruling would have application to two types of
situations: (a) where the indigent had requested
and was refused a transcript subsequent to his
conviction, and (b) where the indigent did not
request a transcript following his conviction.
In both instances, in order to obtain a free
transcript or other appellate assistance, a
defendant must show that he had not waived
his right to a transcript at his original trial.
Where the defendant subsequent to his sentence
had made a timely request for a transcript of
31 Justice Black, in authoring the majority
opinion, failed to indicate the scope of the ruling.
"The sole question for us to decide,.. . is whether
due process or equal protection has been violated"
in this instance. 351 U.S. at 16.
3 Justice Frankfurter implied that, while the
majority holding did not make the ruling retroac-
tive, the law should allow those convicted prior to
the decision to avail themselves of the new law. "We
should not indulge in the fiction that the law now
announced has always been the law, and therefore,
that those who did not avail themselves of it waived
their rights". 351 U.S. at 26.
33Justice Burton stated that: "Mr. Justice Black's
opinion is not limited to the ftiture. It holds that
a past as well as a future conviction of crime in a
state court is invalid when the state has failed to
furnish a free transcript to an indigent de-
fendant.... ." 351 U.S. at 29.
[Vol. 47
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the trial record and this request was denied, he
should not be considered to have waived his
opportunity to avail himself of the Griffin
ruling. Since a defendant who had requested a
transcript at the time of his trial would not
have waived his right to a free transcript, he
would now, under the Grifin ruling, be entitled
to such assistance.
The case ef a convict who did not apply for a
free transcript following his sentence, but who
now asserts a claim under the Griffin ruling to
such assistance poses a different problem. The
indigent must answer the argument that since
he did not request a free transcript following his
conviction, he waived his right to now assert
this claim.3 The United States Supreme Court
has declared that an effective waiver of the
right to appellate process must be conscious,
that is, made with knowledge of that right.n
Knowledge of a right assumes the existence of
that right. The Griffin principle is new law, in
that it affords indigents rights heretofore non-
existent. Therefore, since a defendant could
reasonably have presumed at the time of his
conviction that a free transcript was unobtain-
able, failure to request such aid could not have
constituted a conscious waiver of financial
assistance.
After establishing that he has not waived his
rights created by / the Griffin decision, a
defendant must show that he was indigent
during the period immediately following his
trial when petition for review should have been
filed.36 The fact that he is now impoverished or
14 See, e.g., People v. Heirens, 4 Ill.2d 131, 122
N.E.2d 231 (1954); ILL. R-v. STAT. tit. 38, §828
(1955).
35 See Dowd v. United States, 340 U.S. 206, 209
(1951). In that case, it was held that a prisoner did
not waive his right to post-conviction review by
coramt nobis and habeas corpus petitions when, be-
cause of the lax enforcement of prison rules, he
filed a tardy motion for appeal.
36By Illinois statute, in order to petition for
review, an appellant must furnish the trial judge
with a bill of exceptions, including a transcript of
the trial record, within one hundred days after a
judgment of conviction is entered, or within such
further time thereafter as shall within such one
had been a pauper before his trial should not
satisfy the proof of indigency required to obtain
a transcript or other appellate assistance.
However, if a defendant had requested a free
transcript at the time of his conviction and this
request was denied on grounds other than
failure to meet the forma pauperis require-
ments,37 his contention of prior indigency should
be presumed to be true, a presumption which
could be rebutted by contrary evidence pre-
sented by the state. This presumption is based
upon the difficulty of resurrecting the past in
order to establish a defendant's indigence at
the time of his trial. However, if a defendant
had made no request for a free transcript follow-
ing his sentence, he should have the burden of
substantiating his allegations of prior indi-
gency.35
Illinois, several months after it had enacted
a court rule which afforded free transcripts
prospectively to indigents, amended that
ruling so that it would apply retroactively.39
This amendment did not require a defendant
to have made a request for a free transcript at
the time of his conviction. In addition, the
hundred days be filed by the court. IIL. REv.
STAT. tit. 110, §101.65 (1955).
37A formal application declaring poverty and
requesting aid. See note 5 supra.
33 This contention could be supported by affidavits
from the defendant's attorney, friends, or family,
as well as by a sworn statement by the defendant
himself. As an added safeguard, after the indigent
has been warned of the penalties of perjury, the
trial court clerk should write to the defendant's
next-of-kin informing them of his financial condi-
tion and requesting their aid.
* On September 26, 1956, the Illinois Supreme
Court, amended Sup. CT. RuLE 65-1 (originally
adopted on June 19, 1956), 135 N.E. 2d XXXII,
which allowed any indigent imprisoned after April
23, 1956 (date of the Griffin case) the right to free
transcript of the trial court record. See note 24
supra. The amendment extended the benefits of
rule 65-1 to indigents imprisoned prior to April 23,
1956. Amendment to Rule 65-1, 137 N.E.2d
XXVHII (1956). This amendment was filed on the
same date as the Illinois Supreme Court remanded
the Griffin Case to the trial court for further pro-
ceedings in accordance with rule 65-1. People v.
Griffin, 9 1Il. 2d 156 (1956).
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amended ruling required that the defendant
be without financial means to pay the costs of
a transcript at the time of filing his petition for
a transcript, as well as at the time of his trial.
This position seems unreasonable since a de-
fendant might have been unable'to pay for the
transcript following his conviction, but may
now, perhaps several years after that time, have
the funds to do so. The fact that a convict is
no longer a pauper should not prevent him
from obtaining, at his own expense, the ap-
pellate review which formerly had been denied
to him because of indigency. Although a convict
who can now pay for a transcript should not be
provided with a free one, he should nonetheless
be afforded the same opportunity of obtaining
review as the person who was indigent at the
time of trial and has remained so. Because that
convict was prevented from obtaining free
transcript at his conviction, and therefore was
unable to appeal within the prescribed statutory
period, he should not be allowed to obtain
such review.
After it has been established that the ap-
pellant has not waived his rights under a
retroactive application of the Griffin ruling,
and that he was in fact indigent subsequent to
his conviction in the trial court, the indigent
may proceed to assert his appeal of the case on
the merits by means of the appropriate post-
conviction proceeding.40 A post-conviction ap-
40 In the absence of a post-conviction act, several
common law methods of obtaining appellate review
are available. Some states have expanded the scope
of habeas corpus beyond its traditional confinement
to jurisdictional questions, so as to include review
of any alleged constitutional violation. See, e.g.,
Sneed v. Mays, 66 So.2d 865 (Fla. 1953); Foster v.
State, 97 Okla. Crim. 133, 259 P.2d 542 (1953);
In re Wallace, 24 Cal.2d 933, 152 P.2d 1 (1944). In
other states coram nobis may be used as a means
of asserting alleged violations of constitutional
rights which cannot be reached by habeas corpus.
See, e.g., State ex rel MacMianomon v. Blackford
Circuit Court, 229 Ind. 3, 95 N.E. 2d 556 (1950);
Johnson v. Williams, 244 Ala. 391, 13 So. 2d 683
(1943); Lyons v. Goldstein, 290 N.Y. 19, 47 N.E.
2d 425 (1943). Coram vobis is another common law
mode of post-conviction review. A corain vobis
petition is directed to the appellate court as opposed
peal, under state law, must generally be brought
within a limited period following the appellant's
conviction.a However, delay in appealing is
excusable unless caused by the negligence of
the appellant. The Griffin ruling is new law.
Hence, the delay of an indigent, who was con-
victed prior to the Griffin case, in filing his
post-conviction appeal would not be due to
any negligence on his part and should be con-
sidered excusable.41
CONCLUSION
The Griffin ruling requires that a state afford
indigent defendants in felony cases, and perhaps
in misdemeanor cases as well, full appellate
review. Whether this end can be achieved only
to coram nobis where plea is made to the trial court.
See, e.g., People v. Zajkowski, 121 N.Y.S.2d 586
(County Ct. 1953); Leavitt v. State, 116 Fla. 738,
156 So. 904 (1934). In some jurisdictions audita
querela is available to present an affirmative defense
which could not reasonably have been raised at the
trial court level. See, e.g., Robertson v. Common-
wealth, 279 Ky. 762, 132 S.W.2d 69 (1939); Keith
v. State, 121 Fla. 432, 163 So. 884 (1935). However,
the present trend is toward modem post-conviction
statutes. See, e.g. IL. REv. STAT. tit. 38, §826-32
(1955); N.C. GEN. STAT. §15-217 to -22 (1953).
The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act,
proposed by the Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws and approved by the American Bar Associa-
tion, included a section bearing directly upon aid
to indigents. U.P.C.P.A. §5 (1955). For a discussion
of this proposal see, The Uniform Post-Conviction
Procedure Act, 69 HARv. L. Rzv. 1289 (1956). If
a state does not provide an adequate post-convic-
tion procedure, the defendant may proceed directly
in the federal courts. See Comment, Effect of the
Federal Constitution in Requiring State Post-Convic-
tion Remedies, 53 CoLums. L. Rlv. 1143 (1953).
41 Modem post-conviction acts commonly estab-
lish this period as five years. See, e.g., ILL. REv.
STAT. tit. 38, §826 (1955); N. C. GEN. STAT. §15-217
(1953).
4 See note 35 supra.
4 Because of the lapse of time between trial
and post-conviction review, a bill of exceptions
prepared from memory, e.g., judge's notes, probably
would be inadequate. Therefore, in most retroactive
applications a state would be bound to furnish the
indigent appellant with a free transcript.
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by means of a free transcript depends upon the
nature of the exceptions being taken. The state,
in any event, must afford the indigent without
cost all the essentials for full review in each
particular case.
Since the United States Supreme Court has
not declared itself on the issue of retroactivity,"
it appears that state courts must decide for
themselves whether to apply the Griffin ruling
retroactively. 5 Although Illinois has recently
seen fit to declare the Griffin ruling retroactive,4"
some jurisdictions have implied that they favor
limiting the ruling to the prospective,47 while
other courts appear to have entirely ignored
the decision.48
"The Court's lack of unanimity in the Griffin
case renders it difficult to prophesy with any cer-
tainty what the Court will do if they choose to
decide the issue of retroactivity. Justice Frank-
furter stands squarely for a retroactive interpreta-
tion of the ruling. Justices Burton, Harlan, and
Reed, since they oppose the rule on principle would
probably vote against its retroactive application.
That leaves in doubt the votes of Chief Justice
Warren and Justices Black, Douglas, Clark, and
Brennan, who has recently been appointed to
replace the retired Justice Minton. It will take four
out of the remaining five votes to make the ruling
retroactive. Justice Frankfurther might have diffi-
culty in converting four of his colleagues to his
viewpoint.
45 Where the United States Supreme Court has
not indicated whether its ruling is to be applied
retroactively, a state may apply such a ruling
prospectively without violating due process. Great
Northern Ry. v. Sunburst Oil and Refining Co.,
287 U.S. 358 (1932).
46 See note 39 supra.
47 In United States v. Sanders, 142 F.Supp. 638
(D.Md. 1956) a federal district court implied that
the Griffin principle should be applied prospec-
tively. The court reasoned that the defendant's
counsel must request a free transcript following
the trial court proceedings, and failing to do this,
counsel waived any future right to such transcript.
43 In State v. Trunzo, 137 N.E. 2d 511 (Ohio
1956), the Ohio Court of Appeals held that an
indigent "defendant is not entitled, as a matter of
law, to a bill of exceptions transcribed at the State's
expense for his use in an appeal from a judgment of
guilty." The court ruled that an Ohio statute, allow-
ing a transcript to be granted in the discretion of the
Illinois, through the adoption of a court rule,
has complied with the Griffin doctrine in a
manner which appears inadequate in several
respects. First, the Illinois ruling requires that
the indigent be given a partial or complete
transcript no matter what type of error is
alleged. Second, the ruling is ambiguous as to
whether it is to be applied both in cases of
felonies and misdemeanors. Third, the retro-
active amendment to the ruling sets forth a
discriminatory test in regard to proof of
indigency.
State courts, which must now deal with this
problem, should exercise great care in granting
free transcripts to indigents. A promiscuous
granting of free transcripts might encourage
frivolous appeals at a considerable cost to the
state.49 At the same time, there are an impres-
sive number of inmates who might deservedly
win their freedom if given an opportunity to
appeal.5 0 For this reason, a state court rule or
statute which would substantially limit the
scope of the Griffin principle would be both
violative of the spirit of that decision and
inconsistent with the liberal trend of American
jurisprudence toward a justice free from eco-
nomic discrimination. Therefore, both in its
prospective and retroactive application, the
Griflin decision should be promulgated into
state law with a full appreciation of the prob-
lems which a carelessly formulated ruling
might create.
A Proposed Statute or Court Rule
Any indigent person, convicted of a felony or
a misdemeanor, may file, in the court in which
he was convicted, a petition requesting that he
be furnished without cost a complete steno-
court, rendered final the trial court's denial of a free
transcript. This court apparently was either unaware
of the Griffin case or felt that its action did not come
within the scope of that ruling.
" See note 25 supra. See also, Schaefer, Federalism
and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HaRv. L. Rxv. 1,
10 & n. 31 (1956).
50 Statistics show that a substantial proportion of
criminal convictions are reversed by state appellate
courts. See, e.g., Comment, Reversals in Ilinois
Criminal Cases, 42 HARv. L. REv. 566 (1929).
